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EXCOM 82-7013

29 April 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Committee Members

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FROM:

[REDACTED]
Executive Assistant to the Executive Director

SUBJECT: Minutes of 26 April 1982 Executive Committee Meeting: Long-Range Planning (Phase II) (U)

1. The Executive Committee met on 26 April to review the paper on covert action written under Phase II of this year's long-range planning process. Mr. McMahon (ExDir) chaired the session; participants included Messrs. Stein (DDO); Fitzwater (DDA); Gates (DDI); Taylor (ADDS&T); Lipton (Compt); Briggs (IG); and Glerum (D/OP). (S)

2. Mr. McMahon noted that the DDO paper provided a good framework for discussing the future of covert action. He then offered several suggestions for consideration:

- Given the resources that will be required to rebuild an adequate covert action infrastructure, some training mechanism should be devised to maintain and sharpen required capabilities on a day-to-day basis;



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- Because of the unfavorable connotations of the phrase "human rights," a substitute should be used to reflect concerns about disregard for civil liberties. (S)

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3. [REDACTED] (C/IAD/DDO) then highlighted the paper and the philosophy behind it. He emphasized that collecting intelligence remained the primary mission of the DDO, while the special activities being discussed were considered a secondary function. These activities, nevertheless, often led to increased intelligence collection. He proposed that the covert action paper would be more useful to the planning process if it were shortened, broadened in focus, and less operational and detailed. He concurred with Mr. McMahon's earlier comments. He also explained efforts underway to recreate by 1985 a cadre of "triple-threat" case officers, who could deal with covert action as well as their other responsibilities. [REDACTED] also addressed the differences between the DDI and

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DDO planning papers regarding the future world environment. He explained that the DDO paper took a harder view of the world because, like the military, it had to plan for operating in such a world. He estimated that about [] percent of the covert action program would be Soviet-oriented. He expected a growth in economic and counterterrorist related activities and a continuation of the current level of the narcotics effort. In response to Mr. McMahon's question, [] said that the DDO was thinking about what it could do in the counterterrorist area short of becoming another JSOC. (S)

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4. Mr. Stein observed that better planning for collection and covert action were not mutually exclusive. He concurred with the increased potential for economic covert activity and was intrigued with the prospects for the use of analysis as a covert tool. (S)

5. Mr. Gates identified several problems he had with the covert action paper: the lack of a sense of perspective; the failure to identify core capabilities that should be sustained despite changes in administrations; the omission of the importance of a foreign policy context for successful covert action; the sparse DDI input to the paper; and disagreements with the paper's perceptions of future regional trends. He emphasized that he was an enthusiastic supporter of covert action and believed that his Directorate could play a constructive role. (S)

6. Mr. McMahon agreed that the paper should be revised to include a historical perspective and the philosophy of covert action. He also suggested that extracts from the DDI's projected world environment be substituted for the DDO's world view. In response to [] comment, he said that a geographical approach should be retained because resources were allocated on a geographical basis. He did not think it would be possible to project a foreign policy context for future covert activities. (S)

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7. Mr. Briggs took issue with the overall tone of the paper, the overemphasis on Headquarters-directed media activities, and the lack of defining how covert action could be used to accomplish policy goals. He also expressed concern about DDO Divisions being spread too thin and questioned how much covert action they could realistically implement. (S)

8. Mr. Glerum observed that no agreement seemed to exist on what covert action actually was and perhaps reaching such an understanding should be a goal of this planning process. Mr. Stein suggested that recent briefings for the DCI on what infrastructure was required to rebuild a covert action capability probably represented the best articulation of what covert action should be. Mr. Glerum then emphasized the importance of recruiting and training the required people, the possible need for "nation building" capabilities, the necessity for exercising capabilities once they were developed to maintain necessary skills. []

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9. Mr. McMahon requested that the DDO's 17-point program for building a covert action infrastructure be woven into the paper. Mr. Lipton noted that the paper was too near-term and one-dimensional and lacked options. Mr. Taylor thought [] should have been covered more fully. He also suggested that the paper should note that our covert action program has to be sustained in an environment of leaks. Picking up on Mr. Gates' comments on "core capabilities," he said that the paper should identify those issues likely to remain potential covert action targets over the years. []

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10. In response to Mr. Fitzwater's question, Mr. McMahon explained when support capabilities would be addressed in the planning process. Mr. Stein noted that paramilitary capabilities could be important to the technical collection activities envisioned in the future. (C)

11. Mr. McMahon requested that the covert action paper be revised before the 7 May Executive Committee meeting to reflect the suggestions discussed, including incorporating a section placing our future program in some historical perspective, the philosophy of covert action, the DDI's assessment of the future world environment, the potential for covert action in that environment, and the infrastructure required to carry that out (17-point program). He then adjourned the meeting. (S)



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I. OVERVIEW

This paper has been prepared by the Interdirectorate Planning Team for Counterintelligence in response to guidance provided by the Executive Director for Phase II of the CIA long-range planning for FY 1985 through 1990. It addresses the long-term threat represented by foreign intelligence and security services, reviews and revises the FY 1983 CI Category Base Capability Statement, and lists objectives and goals for meeting the threat.

We have assumed a favorable policy climate for the practice of counterintelligence (CI), the availability of resources (money and manpower) at the current or an increased level and the absence of a major conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the prior concurrence of the Executive Committee Planning Staff, we have excluded from our consideration terrorism (except where there is evidence linking terrorist groups and activities directly to foreign services) and "international illegalities" including narcotics. We also have excluded from our consideration broad technical threats such as SIGINT and Imagery on the grounds that these collection threats and the appropriate countermeasures transcend the responsibilities of counterintelligence.

II. THREAT ASSESSMENT

The hostile activities of foreign intelligence and security services of the communist countries represent, and will continue to represent, the most serious threat to the security of the United States and its allies. Services of the "third world" and even those of countries historically friendly to the United States will represent an increasing threat. While there will be no dramatic change in the numbers and types of operations directed against U.S. interests, the threat will be increased significantly by the continued rapid development of technology used in support of agent operations. Also, the extent of the drain of U.S. and Western technology through espionage and other means, both legal and illegal, is only now beginning to be understood, and, if left unchecked, could become disastrous. A more detailed threat assessment is attached as an appendix.

III. REVIEW AND REVISION OF CI BASE CAPABILITY STATEMENT

CIA's counterintelligence mission is to detect and frustrate the overseas activities of foreign intelligence

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and security services that are inimical to the United States and foreign governments allied or cooperating with it. The Directorate of Operations (DO) plays the leading role in this effort, utilizing the resources of other CIA directorates and the Intelligence Community as required. The present structure of the DO's counterintelligence program is based on the premise that the Directorate as a whole is a CI service with the Counterintelligence Staff as the lead element. The DO's mission includes penetration of foreign intelligence and security services through the recruitment of in-place sources, research and investigation of counterintelligence leads, exploitation of defectors, followup of hostile contacts with Americans overseas, the operational security of its own operations, coordination of the overseas CI activities of other members of the U.S. Intelligence Community, liaison with foreign intelligence and security services, the production of CI studies and disseminations, and the maintenance for the benefit of the Intelligence Community of a central index of foreign counterintelligence information.

25X1 In Fiscal Year 1983, CIA plans to designate [] and [] personnel positions to the counterintelligence effort. 25X1
Augmentations during the period FY 1984-1990 will be required for needed improvements in our capabilities to meet the current and expected counterintelligence threat.

25X1 Just as the 1983 program was described as "a continuation of well established activities", the program for 1985-90 will not see major deviations. There will be some changes in emphasis and greater awareness and use of technological and computerized information support to counterintelligence. Within the DO, an important requirement will be to ensure, through clear managerial commitment, training and career enhancement, a greater appreciation for counterintelligence concerns and a concomitant increasing commitment to counterintelligence operations.

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